

Message Text

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12/47

ACTION NEA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 EUR-08 NSC-05 NSCE-00 INR-05

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P 211210Z DEC 74

FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA BAHRAIN
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INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI U
USINT BAGHDAD IRAQ PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT LEBANON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DOHA QATAR PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA SAUDI ARABIA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT KUWAIT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON ENGLAND PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT OMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IRAN PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MANAMA 1049

LIMDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (REFS ADDIED)

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS : PFOR PBOR EAIR

SUBJECT : AMIR OF QATAR'S COMMENT ON HAWAR

REF: DOHA'S 045

1. DESPITE REPORTS OF DEEP AL-KHALIFA FAMILY ANXIETY
ABOUT QATARI INTENTIONS, GOB HAS NOT BEEN EAGER TO DISCUSS
HAWAR ISSUE WITH US. WHEN I HAVE RAISED IT, RESPONSE OF
FOREIGN MINISTER AND OTHER CABINET MINISTERS HAS BEEN TO
ASSURE ME QATARI-BAHRAINI RELATIONS ARE GOOD, INFORMAL
DISCUSSIONS RE HAWAR CONTINUE INTERMITTENTLY, AND
PROSPECTS FOR SOME SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION ARE ENCOURAGING.
UK AMBASSADOR HERE SEEMS TO BE GETTING SAME LOW KEY
REACTION FROM BAHRAINIS.

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2. I CAN ONLY ASSUME GOB FEELS THIS PROBLEM REALLY NOT USG'S BUSINESS AND THAT WE UNLIKELY TO BE BEST, OR EVEN PLAUSIBLE, PARTY TO TURN TO FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE HELP IN RESOLVING IT. (MOREOVER, GOB PREFERS THAT USG PERCEIVE OF BAHRAIN AS STABLE AND ON GOOD TERMS WITH ALL ITS NEIGHBORS, HENCE AN IDEAL SPOT FOR AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN IN THE GULF TO LOCATE.) SOLE CONTEXT IN WHICH GOB MIGHT BE PRESENTLY INTERESTED IN ENGAGING US IN HAWAR QUESTION IS IN USING TENSIONS WITH QATAR TO JUSTIFY OTHERWISE QUESTIONABLE ARMS REQUESTS. WHEN PRIME MINISTER RECENTLY PLEAD GOB NEEDS FOR TOW TO DETER "CRAZY PEOPLE WHO MIGHT TRY TO LAND HERE", I WAS NOT CERTAIN HE WAS ALLUDING ONLY TO IRAQIS.

3. AS SEEN FROM BAHRAIN, HAWAR EMOTIONALLY IS AN ISSUE BETWEEN THE AL KHALIFA FAMILY AND THE AL THANI RATHER THAN BETWEEN THE PEOPLE OF BAHRAIN AND QATAR. VIRTUALLY NONE OF THE INFLUENTIAL "COMMONER" ELEMENTS IN BAHRAIN CAME FROM THE ARABIAN MAINLAND WITH THE AL KHALIFA OR TRACE THEIR ORIGINS TO THAT AREA. TO THEM HAWAR IS "AL KHALIFA TERRITORY" NOT "BAHRAINI TERRITORY". THE HISTORIC AND EMOTIONAL DIFFICULTY THE AL KHALIFA HAVE IN RECOGNIZING QATAR'S CLAIM TO HAWAR STEMS FROM THEIR DISTASTE FOR ACKNOWLEDGING THE "UPSTART" AL THANI'S CLAIM TO ANY OF QATAR. THE AMIR OPENLY TELLS US HE IS STILL SUBSIDIZING THE TRIBAL RESIDENTS OF ZABARA, WHO ARE "HIS PEOPLE;" AND SIGHS AS IF THIS ACT IS MORE THE BURDEN OF AN ARISTOCRATIC PAST THAN A PLOY IN AN INTERVENTIONIST FUTURE.

4. BAHRAIN AMIR'S STATEMENT (REFTEL) TO QATARI AMIR THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SETTLE HAWAR QUESTION BUT THAT FOREIGN MINISTER, UNDER PRESSURE FROM KUWAITIS, IS OPPOSING SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE TAKEN WITH LARGE PINCH OF SALT. IT IS CHARACTERISTIC OF AMIR ISA (AS WE LEARNED IN DISCUSSING MIDDLE EAST FORCE QUESTION) TO WANT SINCERELY TO AGREE WITH EVERYONE AND TO USE "FOREIGN MINISTER" (SHORTHAND FOR "GOVERNMENT") AS SCAPE GOAT FOR REGIME'S NOT DOING WHAT THE LISTENER OF THE MOMENT WANTS DONE. I SERIOUSLY DOUBT THAT KUWAITIS GIVE A HOOT ABOUT HAWAR AS

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A PRECEDENT FOR ANYTHING. IS SUSPECT THAT WHAT AMIR "MEANT TO SAY" WAS THE AL KHALIFA HAVE NO INTENTION OF GIVING UP THEIR CLAIM TO HAWAR UNDER IMMEDIATE CIRCUMSTANCES.

5. IN THE GULF, AS IN LAW, A CLAIM IS AN ASSET NOT LIGHTLY ABANDONED. SOME AL KHALIFA, REPORTEDLY THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESUMABLY OTHER RELATIVELY TRADITIONALIST SENIOR MEMBERS, PROBABLY ATTACH SOME EMOTION TO HAWAR.

AMIR, AN ACCOMMODATING MAN, AND FOREIGN MINISTER, A MODERN ONE, SEEM TO CARE LESS ABOUT THE PATRIMONY, BUT WOULD BE LOATHE TO RISK SPLITTING THE FAMILY UNLESS SETTLEMENT OF THIS DISPUTE WERE EITHER COMPELLING OR EXTREMELY ATTRACTIVE. THE AL KHALIFA MAY BE WORRIED BUT THEY ARE FAR FROM STUPID.

6. HOW COMPELLING IS KHALIFA AL THANI'S PRESSURE FOR CLEAR TITLE TO HAWAR? HE COULD RATTLE HIS SABRE BUT THIS WOULD BE EXTREMELY BAD FORM IN A GULF WHERE THE LITTORAL STATES ARE PIOUSLY PREACHING "COOPERATION" AND THE GREAT POWERS ARE BREATHLESSLY AWAITING THE FIRST HINT OF "INSTABILITY". THE AL KHALIFA, WRAPPED IN THE MANTLE OF OFFENDED RIGHTEOUSNESS, WOULD GO SCURRYING TO KING FAISAL, AND PROBABLY COULD BANK ON HIS SUPPORT IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES. IF (AS REFTEL REPORTS) QATARI AMIR HAS INDEED PERSUADED FAISAL TO "SUPPORT" HIS CLAIM, AL KHALIFA CAN STILL BANK ON PROBABILITY FAISAL CHARACTERISTICALLY WILL DO NOTHING ABOUT THIS RELATIVELY PERIPHERAL ISSUE, OR ELSE LEND ONLY TEPID, AMBIVALENT DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT TO QATAR.

7. HOW ATTRACTIVE IS KHALIFA AL THANI'S REPORTED OFFER OF COMPENSATION FOR HAWAR? HIS REFUSAL, UNDERSTANDABLE THOUGH IT IS, TO LINK HIS PROFFERED GENEROSITY DIRECTLY TO THE AL KHALIFA CLAIM IS LIKELY TO BE REGARDED AS INSULTING IN BAHRAIN. HE REPORTEDLY OFFERS TO SHARE ANY FUTURE OIL REVENUES IN A TERRITORY WHICH PRESENTLY IS GENERALLY REGARDED AS OF MINIMAL PETROLEUM INTEREST.

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ACTION NEA-06

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USINT BAGHDAD IRAQ PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY DOHA QATAR PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA SAUDI ARABIA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT KUWAIT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON ENGLAND PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MANAMA 1049

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS : PFOR PBOR EAIR

SUBJECT : AMIR OF QATAR'S COMMENT ON HAWAR

CHEAPLY?) AMIR KHALIFA AL THANI OFFERS MONEY, BUT REPORTEDLY NOT MUCH MORE THAN BAHRAIN GOT LAST MONTH FROM SHAYKH ZAYID FOR APPARENTLY NO MORE HARD NOSED REASONS THAN THE GENEROSITY OF THE AL KHALIFA TO THE AL NU'AYYAN IN HARDER TIMES AND THE DESIRE FOR FUTURE GOOD WILL. IN SHORT, THE AL THANI TERMS PROBABLY DO NOT MOVE THE AL KHALIFA TO MAKE A DEAL AT THIS TIME.

8. BAHRAINS' MINISTERS FREELY ACKNOWLEDGE THE HAWAR ISSUE SHOULD BE RESOLVED INsofar AS IT POSES A MEANINGFUL IMPEDIMENT TO COOPERATION AMONG THE GULF STATES. UNFORTUNATELY IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH QATAR IS NOT TOP PRIORITY ON BAHRAIN'S LIST OF STEPS TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE COOPERATION IN THE GULF, AND THE GOB TELLS US IT THINKS CONFIDENTIAL

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THE GULF STATES ARE IN NO CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER OF REALLY MEANINGFUL INSTITUTIONALIZED COOPERATION ANYWAY. THUS THE AL KHALIFA PROBABLY FEEL THEY CAN CONTAIN THE HAWAR ISSUE UNTIL QATAR SUBSTANTIALLY RAISES THE PRICE, OR UNTIL OTHER GULF NEIGHBORS, PARTICULARLY THE SAUDIS, START SERIOUSLY TO URGE SETTLEMENT.

9. U.S. INTEREST. UNQUESTIONABLY SETTLEMENT OF THIS PROBLEM, AND CONSEQUENT IMPROVEMENT IN QATARI/BAHRAINI RELATIONS, WOULD SERVE U.S. INTERESTS IN FOSTERING HARMONY AND STABILITY IN THE GULF. I HOPE THAT ELSEWHERE, AND PARTICULARLY WITH THE SAUDIS, WE INDICATE, AS WE HAVE BEEN DOING HERE, U.S. INTEREST IN SEEING THIS PROBLEM RESOLVED AMIABLY INsofar AS IT OBSTRUCTS REAL PROSPECTS FOR COOPERATION IN THE GULF. BUT FROM HERE THIS PROBLEM DOES NOT LOOM WITH THE MAGNITUDE OF OTHER GULF TERRITORIAL DISPUTES NOW RESOLVED -- IRAN'S CLAIMS TO BAHRAIN AND TUNBS/ABU MUSA AND THE BURAIMI DISPUTE -- TO SAY NOTHING OF THE IRAQI/KUWAITI PROBLEM. I HOPE WE DO NOT LET

OURSELVES BE DRAWN INTO DIRECT INVOLVEMENT WITH TRYING
TO SETTLE IT OR SOMEHOW ENCOURAGE THE AL THANIS AND AL
KHALIFAS TO BLOW IT OUR OF PROPORTION.
TWINAM

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